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NOTES
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN GRANTING BAIL
Introduction
The "judicial hunch" has undoubtedly played a major role in
granting bail in criminal prosecutions. The first setting of bail,'
when discretionary with the judge is by nature conducive to snap
judgment and many times is done in haste.2 Often public opinion 3
persuades the arraigning magistrate to deny bail or set it at a pro-
hibitive sum. The public, though alert to condone judicial odium
vent upon a local thug or communist, may be slow to comprehend
the necessity for uniform protection of constitutional and statutory
rights.
Often the hasty judgment of such judges must be tested by tem-
pered considerations of an appellate court.4 A reviewing court will
not generally set aside an order denying bail or fixing it at an in-
ordinately high amount, unless there has been a clear abuse of dis-
1 When the accused first makes application to be released pending trial thejudge might conceivably, in various factual situations, applicable statutes per-
mitting, do any one of the following: (1) release defendant on his own re-
cognizance, with or without security (see Ex parte Tittle, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 597,
40 S. W. 598 (1897); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 16 Mass. 423 (1820)),
(2) require that a bond be posted by one or more sureties in a reasonable
amount, (3) require a bond in a prohibitive amount and thus effectively deny
bail, (4) deny all bail, and order defendant to be committed to jail pending
trial.2 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 4 (1951).
S". . . the defect in the proceedings below appears to be that provoked by
the flight of certain Communists after conviction, the Government demands
and public opinion supports a use of the bail power to keep Communist defen-
dants in jail before conviction."
". .. it is contrary to the whole policy and philosophy of bail." Id. at
10. See Ex parte Stegman, 112 N. J. Eq. 72, 163 AtI. 422, 428 (1932).
4 An extended discussion of the procedural aspects of bail will not be
attempted. A few basic principles may be outlined. The traditional method
of obtaining release at common law after bail was denied by habeas corpus.
In New York and other states habeas corpus is also employed to challenge
the bail set as excessive. People ex rel. Deliz v. Prison Warden, 260 App.
Div. 155, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 435 (1st Dep't 1940); see Evans v. Foster, 1 N. H.
374, 378 (1819). But see In re Polizzi, 61 Ohio App. 354, 22 N. E. 2d 569
(1939). The proper procedure in the federal courts, however, in the absence
of extraordinary circumstances, is by motion to reduce bail. An order denying
a motion to reduce bail is a final decision, and therefore appealable. Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 6 (1951).
cretion.5 The constitutional and statutory provisions relating to bail
in most jurisdictions, 6 are broadly drawn leaving the amount to be
set to the wide discretion of the trial judge but the appeal court will
also test orders denying or granting bail by judge-made criteria.
These criteria include: (1) nature and gravity of the offense,
(2) character of the defendant as evidenced by his conduct, (3) prob-
ability of his guilt, (4) his financial ability to post bond, and (5) spe-
cial circumstances of each case. The working value of these criteria
has seldom been challenged or examined. 7 Like other rules in law
generally, the ones for bail may be measured in terms of means and
ends.8 The value of each rule in bail depends upon the extent that
it serves the overall purpose of bail, which is universally stated to be:
"... to secure the due attendance of the party accused ... ." 9
I. THE "RIGHT" TO BAIL
a. The Federal Rule
The question whether the United States Constitution guarantees
one the right to bail was answered by the Supreme Court on March
10, 1952 in Carlson v. Landon.10 Petitioners, members of the Coin-
An appeal court "will not grant a reduction of bail unless it appears that
the amount fixed by the trial court is excessive and clearly disproportionate to
the offense involved." Ex parte Holden, 24 P. 2d 665, 666 (Okla. 1933).
5 Stack v. Boyle, supra note 2. In People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of
City Prison, 265 App. Div. 474, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 526 (1st Dep't 1943), the
accused stood charged with forty-seven counts of extortion. Upon a hearing
on accused's application for bail in General Sessions, it developed that he had
been convicted of seven crimes, had "jumped bail" pending an appeal from a
conviction in the federal courts, and had remained a fugitive for about a year.
The Judge at General Sessions denied the application, on the showing of this
record. Relator, accused's brother, obtained habeas corpus from Special Term,
and on the return of the writ Special Term ordered that accused be admitted
to bail in the sum of $100,000. The Appellate Division (First Dep't) reversed
by a divided court, on the ground that Special Term had interfered with a
decision of the judge at General Sessions made in the exercise of sound dis-
cretion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 290 N. Y. 393, 49 N. E. 498 (1943).
6 A notable exception to this is in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, where a number of the judge-made criteria are codified. Rule 46(c)
provides that the judge, in setting the amount of the undertaking, should have
regard to ". . . the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight
of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail
and the character of the defendant. FED. R. Cain. P. 46(c), 18 U. S. C.
3141 (1946).
7 ". . . [T]here is little in our books to help guide federal judges in bail
practice...." Jackson, J., concurring in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 13 (1951).8 MICHAEL AND WECSHLER, THE CRImiNAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
(1940). ". . . [Tihe determination of what kind of legal activity to undertake
turns on the ends which ought to be served, and the means which are well
adapted to serving them." Id. at 4.
9 Ex parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704, 710 (U. S. 1835).
072 Sup. Ct. 525 (1952).
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munist party, were detained without bail pending determination of
their deportability pursuant to Section 22 of the Internal Security
Act of 1950.11 The Act provides that an alien awaiting a deporta-
tion hearing may "... . in the discretion of the Attorney General...
be released under bond in the amount of not less than $500 .... , 12
Petitioners contended that they were entitled to bail as a constitu-
tional right, and that the provision for detention without bail vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment's guarantee that "... [e]xcessive bail
shall not be required .. ," 18
In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, Mr. Justice Reed
speaking for a majority 14 of the court, stated that the Amendment,
like its English predecessor, does not guarantee the right to bail in
all instances but is merely a safeguard to prevent excessive bail in
the instances where it is properly granted.
However, less than six months before the Carlson case, the same
Court in Stack v. Boyle '5 holding that a bail of $50,000.00 for each
of twelve defendants charged with conspiring to "teach the over-
throw of the government by force and violence," 16 was excessive,
declared in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson that, ". . . unless
this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of inno-
cence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its
meaning." 17
The petitioners in the Stack case, active leaders of the Commu-
nist party, were charged with an infamous crime, while those in the
Carlson case were only members of the Party, constituting a ground
for deportation '8 but not as yet a criminal offense. A number of
the Carlson petitioners had enviable records in their communities.' 9
Yet the right to bail was extended only to the defendants in the Stack
case.
21 INTERNAL SacuRt= AcT oF, 1950, § 22. See Legis., Commuisn and the
Constitutio*-Internal Security Act of 1950, 25 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 397 (1951).
22 INTENA SEcURiTY Act § 23.
23 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. VIII.
14 Frankfurter, J., dissented; Burton, J., dissented in a separate opinion.
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion cited any case either squarely
upholding or denying the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to a denial
of bail. The absence of authority is understandable because: (1) The Eighth
Amendment only applies in the federal courts, where the right to bail is guar-
anteed by statute, (2) the right to bail is guaranteed by most state constitutions.'
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in a separate opinion, stated that under the
view adopted by the majority "[T]he Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive
bail means just about nothing." Id. at 542. Douglas, J., dissented on a ground
totally unconnected with the Eighth Amendment.
15 342 U. S. 1 (1951).
16 18 U. S. C. §§371, 2385 (1946 Supp.) (Smith Act).
17 Supra note 15 at 4.
18 INTEXRNAL SECURITy AcT op 1950, § 22.
19 72 Sup. Ct. 525 (1952).
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These two cases, when contrasted, illustrate one of the anomalies
of bailing procedure. While the right to bail is not constitutionally
provided for, a defendant if admitted to bail at all is entitled consti-
tutionally to a reasonable bond.20 However, the right to bail is guar-
anteed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which since the
"passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789" have ".... unequivocally pro-
vided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admit-
ted to bail." 21 Though the right to bail does not extend to those
charged with an offense punishable by death, it may nevertheless be
granted in the court's discretion,22 in which case the federal judge is
to give ". . . due weight to the evidence, and to the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense." 23
b. State Constitutional Guarantees
In many states, the right to bail before trial is expressly guar-
anteed by constitutional provisions, 24 which make bail mandatory in
all cases except "... . for capital offenses when the proof of guilt is
evident or the presumption thereof is great." 25 These provisions,
attempting to draw a clear-cut distinction between bailable and non-
bailable offenses, have resulted in confusion. Whether the accused
first makes application for bail, or thereafter institutes habeas corpus
proceedings for his release when it is denied, the result is invariably
a "trial before trial" to determine first, whether the offense is capital
and second, whether the presumption of guilt is great.
A capital offense is usually interpreted as one punishable by
death; 26 and in some states treason and murder are the only capital
crimes within the meaning of the bail provisions. 2 7 Ordinarily, where
the defendant is charged with a capital homicide, it must be shown
that he can be convicted of murder in the first degree to properly
deny him bail. Therefore, in states where the burden is on the
accused 28 to prove his right to bail in a hearing for that purpose, he
2 0 Desmond, Bail-Ancient and Modern, 1 Biuw. L. REv. 245, 248 (1952).
21 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 4 (1951).
22 FED. R.CRim. P. 46(a) (1), 18 U. S. C. §3141 (1946).
23 Id. Rule 46(c).
24 The constitutional and statutory provisions have been compiled in a com-
prehensive note: The Administration of Bail, 41 YALE L. J. 293 (1931).
25 OKLA. CoNsT. Art. II, § 8. "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof of guilt is evident, or the
presumption thereof is great." See Ex parte Frey, 85 Okla. Cr. R. 198, 187
P. 2d 253 (1947).
28EX parte Berry, 198 Wash. 317, 88 P. 2d 427 (1939) (kidnapping capital
offense).
27 See, e.g., Ex parte Gibson, 112 Tex. Cr. R. 493, 17 S. W. 2d 820 (1929).
But see Ex parte Orme, 59 Okla. Cr. R. 342, 60 P. 2d 213 (1936). See ORFELD,
CRimiNAL PROCEmu FROm ARREST TO AP.EA 101, 107, 108 (1947).
28 In seven states the burden is upon the applicant defendant in a habeas
corpus proceeding to be admitted to bail to show the proof is not evident, and
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will have to produce exculpating evidence 29 or mitigating circum-
stances . 0  This evidence, usually offered on trial to show innocence
or to reduce the murder to a lower degree, is thus made the sine qua
non for bail. Thus, the prisoner in a bail hearing is presumed
guilty 31 and while, for trial purposes, he is protected from adverse
inferences which may be drawn from his failure to testify, in a bail
hearing his ".... [s] ilence ceases to be golden." 32
It is the established rule in a number of states that an indict-
ment for a capital offense, in itself, raises a presumption of guilt suf-
ficient to effectuate a denial of bail.33 In some states this presump-
tion is rebuttable while in others it is conclusive.3 4 The rule orig-
inated from the practice of keeping grand jury minutes sealed and
secret.35 Where the accused was committed by a magistrate, the
bailing judge could conceivably look to the minutes of the proceed-
ing as an aid in determining the accused's probable innocence or
guilt. Where a sealed indictment was handed down, no correspond-
ing source of information was available, thereby giving rise to the
rule that an indictment based on secret minutes is presumptive evi-
dence of the prisoner's guilt-for bail purposes. There seems to be
no justification for the rule's continuance since grand jury minutes
are now preserved and recorded for the court's use.
Some jurisdictions, 36 with a view toward consistency, place the
burden on the state to show the "presumption great" and the "proof
evident" when the right to bail is in issue, reasoning that "[t]he
that the presumption of guilt is not great. Alabama: Webb v. State, 50 So.
2d 451 (Ala. 1951); California: Ex parte Page, 82 Cal. App. 576, 255 Pac.
887 (1927) ; Florida: Ex parte .Tully, 70 Fla. 1, 66 So. 296 (1914) ; Illinois:
Lynch v. People, 38 Ill. 494 (1865) (by implication); Indiana: State v. Hedges,
177 Ind. 589, 98 N. E. 417 (1912) ; Nevada: State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, 200
P. 2d 657 (1948) ; Oklahoma: x parte Andrews, 39 Okla. Cr. R. 359, 265
Pac. 144 (1928).29 Lx parte Key, 189 P. 2d 619 (Tex. Cr. App. 1948) (testimony pointing
toward fact that homicide was accidental); Ex parte Frey, supra note 25 (tes-
timony that accused killed in self defense in a fight started by decedent).301n re Perry, 19 Wis. 711 (1865).31 Ex parte Stegman, 112 N. J. Eq. 72, 163 Atl. 422 (1932) (by implication).
32 See Ex parte Burgess, 309 Mo. 397, 274 S. W. 423, 426 (1925).
33 Rogers v. State, 30 Ala. App. 226, 4 So. 2d 266, cert. denied, 241 Ala.
633, 4 So. 2d 267 (1941) ; In re Scott, 38 Neb. 502, 56 N. W. 1009 (1893).34 Ex parte Womach, 62 Okla. Cr. R. 290, 71 P. 2d 494 (1937) (robbery
information prima facie evidence of guilt).
35 People v. Dixon, 3 Abb. Prac. 395 (N. Y. 1856). See Note, Administra-
tion of Bail, 41 YALE L. J. 293 (1931).
36 See Arizona: In re Haigler, 15 Ariz. 150, 137 Pac. 423 (1913) ; Iowa:
Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243, 156 N. W. 513 (1916) ; Kentucky: Commonwealth
v. Stahl, 237 Ky. 388, 35 S. W. 2d 563 (1931) ; Montana: State ex rel. Murray
v. District Court, 35 Mont. 504, 90 Pac. 513 (1907); South Dakota: State v.
Kaufman, 20 S. D. 620, 108 N. W. 246 (1906); Texas: Ex parte Perkins,
118 Tex. Cr. R. 178, 40 S. W. 2d 123 (1931) (by implication).
[ VOL. 27
NOTES
presumption of innocence goes with the defendant at all times, and
for all purposes .... ,,37
c. When is the "Presumption Great"?
In those states where the indictment itself creates no presump-
tion of guilt of the capital offense there are divergent views on the
quantum of evidence necessary to create such a presumption, and
conversely to rebut it. On one side it has been held that the evidence
must indicate with certainty that defendant will flee 38 if bailed, and
on the other that it must indicate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 39
Usually testimony to the effect that a homicide was accidental 40
or was committed in self defense 41 will be sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption. It has been held insufficient to establish guilt where the
sole evidence against a defendant charged with rape was the uncor-
roborated testimony of a thirteen-year-old girl.42  A joinder by the
state's attorney in defendant's motion for bail is held to be an admis-
sion that the proof is not evident.43
d. Discretion under New York's Statutory Scheme
The New York Constitution, like the Federal Constitution, guar-
antees no right to bail.44 However, in prosecutions for misdemeanors,
bail is a matter of right by statute.4 But in cases of felony, the de-
fendant's freedom before trial is discretionary with the court 4 6 which
is to be governed by common law rules.4 7
Superimposed upon this foundation of basic rules is a system of
procedural "hedging in" 48 based upon the lack of jurisdiction of
some courts to give bail, under certain circumstances. Thus, per-
sons charged with a crime punishable by death, or with inflicting an
37 Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky. 388, 35 S. W. 2d 563, 564 (1931). The
court stated that the fact that grand jury proceedings were secret and ex parte
is another reason for holding that no presumption of guilt should be created by
the indictment ". . . the accused is not present and in many instances is ignorant
of the fact that charges against him are being considered . . . " Id. at 564.
38Ex parte Welsh, 236 Mo. App. 1129, 162 S. W. 2d 358 (1942).
39 Pair v. State, 32 Ala. App. 90, 22 So. 2d 100, cert. deaied, 246 Ala. 672,
22 So. 2d 101 (1945).
40 State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, 200 P. 2d 657 (1948).41 See Ex parte Frey, supra note 25, 187 P. 2d at 254.42 Ex parte Hathorn, 148 Tex. Cr. R. 576, 189 S. W. 2d 1021 (1945).
43 Mendenhall v. Sweat, 117 Fla. 659, 158 So. 280 (1934).
44 The only constitutional provision in New York relating to bail is that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required . .. ." N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 5.45N. Y. CODE CRUI. PRoC. §553(1).
46 N. Y. CODE CuM. PROC. § 553(2).
47 People v. Mott, 97 Misc. 86, 162 N. Y. Supp. 272 (Sup. Ct. 1916).48 See People v. Hevern, 127 Misc. 141, 146, 215 N. Y. Supp. 412, 417 (Mag.
Ct. 1926).
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injury, which if death ensued, would be murder, are bailable only
by a judge of general sessions, a justice of the supreme court, or a
judge of the county court.40  Also, those charged with the commis-
sion of a second felony, or with a second designated misdemeanor Do
fall within the same proscription-and cannot, therefore, obtain pre-
liminary bail from a magistrate. 5' Even when such persons can ob-
tain bail from a court having jurisdiction to grant it, they must, as
a prerequisite, be fingerprinted,5 2 if facilities therefor are available.
These provisions, enacted in 1926 53 "in response to an asserted
necessity for more stringent penal laws," r1 are undoubtedly effective
in discovering the recidivist. They have, however, operated, on at
least one occasion, to delay pre-trial freedom for a defendant charged
with a technical violation.55 In People v. Hevern,56 the defendant,
whose car struck a pedestrian, was detained without bail two days on
a charge of "felonious assault," because "the magistrate refused to
fix bail for lack of power." 57
49N. Y. CODE Cm. PRoc. § 552(1) (2).
50 "... illegally using, carrying or possessing a pistol or other dangerous
weapon; making or possessing burglars instruments; buying or receiving stolen
property; unlawful entry of a building; aiding escape from prison; that kind
of disorderly conduct defined in subdivisions six and eight of section seven
hundred and twenty-two of the penal law; violations of sections four hundred
eighty-three-b, and eleven hundred forty of the penal law; that kind of sodomy
or rape which is designated as a misdemeanor; and any violation of any pro-
vision of article twenty-two of the public health law relating to narcotic drugs
which is defined as a misdemeanor ... ." N. Y. CODE Caim. Paoc. § 552(3).
An additional paragraph grants to the Justices of the Court of Special
Sessions of the City of New York jurisdiction to admit to bail any defendant
charged with a misdemeanor in that court "notwithstanding the foregoing
limitations." N. Y. CODE CUM. PROC. § 552(3).
5' In addition, the right to bail from a magistrate is effectively denied to a
person charged with "a felony or with any of the misdemeanors or offenses
specified in this section and it shall also appear from the defendant's finger
prints, or otherwise, that there is reason to believe that he has either (a) been
previously convicted within the state of a felony, or an attempt to commit a
felony, or a crime under the laws of another state, government or country
which if committed within this state would be a felony; or (b) has been twice
so convicted of any one of such misdemeanors or offenses or convicted of any
two of them." N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 552(3), as amended, Laws of
N. Y. 1947, c. 672, § 1; Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 606; Laws of N. Y. 1951,
c. 708.52 N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 552-a.
53 Laws of N. Y. 1926, c. 419.
54 People v. Hevern, 127 Misc. 141, 143, 215 N. Y. Supp. 412, 414 (Mag.
Ct. 1926).
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid. Defendant's automobile struck a pedestrian. He was arrested and
charged with felonious assault. He was arraigned in night court on a Satur-
day and was refused bail. Defendant remained overnight in the police station.
He was again arraigned in Magistrate's Court Sunday. He was admitted to
bail late Sunday by a county judge and held for arraignment on Monday.
When the defendant was arraigned on Monday, the arraigning magistrate
[ VOL. 27
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e. Scope of Constitutional and Statutory Guarantees
The "right" to bail is considered not to attach until the defen-
dant is within the indicting jurisdiction.58 The Uniform Extradition
Act 59 adopted in New York,0° and, in varying forms, in many other
states,61 permits the courts of the arresting jurisdiction to admit a
non-capital defendant to bail in the extradition proceeding, but does
not require it.62 A statute providing for pre-trial detention of parties
charged with certain crimes in order to examine them for communi-
cable diseases has been upheld as not denying the constitutional right
to bail.6 3 A similar statute authorizing the detention of sex psycho-
paths without bail was upheld. 4
It has been held that the right to bail may be waived by pleading
guilty, or by asking for adjournments.65 Since a probation or parole
violator may be committed to prison on the original charge, he may
claim no constitutional or statutory right to bail before trial. 66
refused to enforce the "felony" and "fingerprinting" provisions of the new bail
laws, characterizing them "unconstitutional." Id. at 146, 147, 215 N. Y. Supp.
at 417, 418. A few days later, the arraigning magistrate received a letter from
the chief magistrate stating in part: "As to the broad and sweeping ques-
tions such as the constitutionality of the law, that remains to be decided by
the higher and reviewing courts." The New York Times, April 28, 1926, p. 27.
See Legis., The Baumes Bills, a Beginning in the Reorganization of Criminal
Procedure in New York, 26 COL. L. REv. 752, 753 (1926). The "higher" and
"reviewing" courts have not had occasion to pass on the sections. They have
been amended periodically, and new misdemeanors have been added to the list
of "non-bailable offenses." N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.. § 552(1) (2) (3) as amend-
ed, Laws of N. Y. 1947, c. 672, § 1; Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 606; Laws of N. Y.
1951, c. 708. Subd. 3, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 606; Laws of N. Y.
1951, c. 708. N. Y. CODE CamI. PROC. § 552-a (fingerprinting), as amended,
Laws of N. Y. 1947, c. 283.
58 1n re Gorsline, 10 Abb. Prac. 282 (N. Y. 1860) (arrested in another
county).
5 9 UNIFORM EXTRAD. AcT § 16; 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 169.
60 N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC. § 845 (1936).
61 See Annotations in 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 175 et seq.
62 . Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 845. "Unless the offense with which the
prisoner is charged is shown to be an offense punishable by death or life im-
prisonment under the laws of the state in which he was committed, a justice
of the supreme court or county judge in this state may admit the person ar-
rested to bail . . . in such sum as he deems proper ... " (emphasis added).
63 People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54 N. E. 2d 441 (1944).
Petitioners were charged with soliciting to prostitution and were held without
bail pursuant to ILL. RZEv. STAT. 1943, cc. 2, 3, 1392, for physical exam-
ination to determine if they were infected with communicable venereal disease.
Petitioners, on appeal, challenged the constitutionality of the statute, as depriv-
ing them of the right to bail. Held: The statute is constitutional. "The power
to detain a person who is suspected of having a contagious disease rests in the
police power of the state." Id. 54 N. E. 2d at 443.
64 People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 583, 4 N. W. 2d 18 (1942). See also
Bail for Sex Psychopaths, 31 NEB. L. BuLL. 95 (1951).
65 See Devine v. People, 20 Hun 98. 100 (N. Y. 1880).
66 See N. Y. CODE CRIM. Paoc. § 935. "Whenever within the period of pro-
1952 ]
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II. JUDGE-MADE CRITERIA
It is against this background of statutory and constitutional guar-
antees that a court weighs each bail application. Where statutory
provisions have no application, and bail is granted in varying
amounts, or denied entirely, in the court's discretion, several criteria
guide the judge in his determination.
a. Nature and Gravity of the Offense
Common sense dictates that the atrocity of the offense charged,
and the probable length of the accused's incarceration if found guilty,
should bear on whether bail is granted, or if granted, in what amount.
One charged with murder, though wrongly, is more likely to flee the
jurisdiction if bailed than one charged with vagrancy.
Undoubtedly the "Capital Crime" distinction previously dis-
cussed, which evolved at common law and found its way into many
state constitutions,6 7 crystallized from the realization that the atrocity
of the offense is directly proportional to the probability of the defen-
dant absconding. This common place has found expression in nu-
merous holdings. 68
Where, however, the atrocity of the offense has induced the judge
to deny bail or set it at a prohibitive sum, not for insuring the defen-
dant's presence at the trial, but to satiate an outraged public, it has
been held error. Thus, an accused may not constitutionally be in-
carcerated because "public opinion" demands it,69 or because he is
charged with a crime that, in the eyes of the committing magistrate
and prosecution, make him "unfit to mingle in society." 70 Conceiv-
ably, a judge, actually persuaded by the demands of an outraged pub-
lic, may deny bail or set it at a prohibitive sum, assigning as an osten-
sible reason his fear that the defendant will abscond, if given an op-
portunity. Where, however, the methods employed by the judge have
indicated a preconceived intent to incarcerate a defendant before trial,
bation any probationer shall violate his probation, the court may issue a warrant
for his arrest and may commit him, with or without bail .
67 See Section Ib, this Note.
68 See, e.g., People v. Van Home, 8 Barb. 158 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1850).
"Where the punishment is death or a degrading imprisonment, the presumption
is strong that the accused will attempt to elude the demands of justice." Id.
at 165.
69 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 (1951).
70 Gusick v. Boies, 72 Ariz. 309, 234 P. 2d 430 (1951). The accused was
charged with sex crimes which outraged the community. The method pursued
to keep defendant in jail was the practice of filing multitudinous charges
against him, and obtaining orders from the magistrate requiring additional bail
on these charges. Id. 24 P. 2d at 431. See also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1
(1952).
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merely to succumb to public opinion, the order denying or setting
excessive bail has been held unconstitutional. 71
Nevertheless, it is difficult in many instances to determine the
extent to which the atrocity of the crime contributes, consciously or
unconsciously, to the bailing judge's decision.
b. Character of Defendant as Evidenced by His Conduct
The defendant's previous criminal record, 72 the circumstances
surrounding his arrest,73 his demeanor in court, his reputation in the
community, are testimonials to his character, and proper items for
the court's examination in ruling on a bail application.
The fact that the defendant voluntarily surrendered to the police
is said to indicate his lack of intent to flee the jurisdiction 74 therebyjustifying his admission to bail in a reasonable amount even if charged
with a serious offense, and even if he had previously been indicted
for "jumping bail." 75 But other influencing circumstances must of
necessity be considered. Habitual criminals have been known to sur-
render in the hope of being permitted to plead to a lesser charge, and
this does not indicate an intent to remain. Likewise, the fact that
accused surrendered to the police had little significance where the sur-
render took place in Paraguay, and extradition proceedings were
necessary.76 An accused's past record may be strong evidence of a
propensity to flee.77  While a previous conviction should not alone
warrant setting bail at a prohibitive sum, 78 nevertheless, a record re-
vealing that the accused has previously "jumped bail" 79 or has been
a fugitive from justice 80 would seem to justify strong measures. In
a number of cases, however, bail has been reduced as being excessive
where defendants had previously forfeited bonds posted in connec-
tion with other charges,8 ' or even in connection with the same
7 Ibid.
72 Ex parte Lonardo, 86 Ohio 289, 89 N. E. 2d 502 (1949).
7 3 Infra, Section Ie of this Note dealing with "Circumstances of the case."7 4 See Rex v. Lord Baltimore, 4 Burr. 2179, 98 Eng. Rep. 136 (1768;.
... [V]oluntary surrender was a strong indication that he had no intention of
absconding from justice . . . ." Id. 98 Eng. Rep. at 137.
75 People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N. Y. 109, 71 N. E. 2d 423 (1947).
76 People v. Mott, 97 Misc. 86, 162 N. Y. Supp. 272 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
77 Ex parte Lonardo, 86 Ohio 289, 89 N. E. 2d 502, 504 (1949).
78 Ex parte Nabors, 135 Tex. Cr. R, 528, 121 S. W. 2d 596 (1938).
79EX parte Calloway, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 347, 265 S. W. 699 (1924).
so In re Grimes, 99 Cal. App. 10, 277 Pac. 1052 (1929); In re Scott, 38
Neb. 502, 56 N. W. 1009 (1893) (defendant fled to Mexico); Ex parte Thomas,
91 Tex. Cr. R. 49, 237 S. W. 302 (1922) (accused sawed his way out of jail).81 People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N. Y. 109, 71 N. E. 2d 423
(1947). This is vividly illustrated by the following passage from Waite, Code
of Criminal Procedure: The Problem of Bail, 15 A. B. A. J. 71 (1929). "A
man was arrested in Detroit on the charge of picking pockets; he secured re-
lease on bail and while the first case. was pending he was arrested four addi-
tional times for picking pockets and securea bail each time." Id. at 72.
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charge.8 2  Similarly, defendants have been bailed in a prosecution
brought for a breach of the peace, where the breach also constituted
a violation of a prior bond posted in an arson prosecution. 3 A
habeas corpus proceeding has resulted in reducing bail in New York
for a defendant charged with a felony, and whose ". . . record . . .
showed several previous indictments, including one for 'jumping
bail' .... " 84
Threats made by the defendant to escape if allowed the oppor-
tunity may be considered in determining the reasonableness of the
amount of bail,85 but do not constitute a ground for the denial of bail
entirely.88
There has been a tendency in recent years to give greater weight
to the prior criminal record of the accused. People ex rel. Sammons
v. Snow 87 appears to be the starting point. The petitioner Sammons,
arrested on a vagrancy charge, brought a habeas corpus proceeding
to be admitted to bail in a reasonable amount. Bail had been orig-
inally set at $10,000.00 and subsequently increased to $50,000.00.
The maximum penalty for the vagrancy charge was six months at
hard labor, or a fine of $100.00. A bail of a few hundred dollars
seemed in order. But Sammons had an impressive record. He had
been convicted of rape, and paroled. He obtained a reprieve from a
death sentence for murder, and was sent to prison for life; he escaped,
was returned, paroled, and finally discharged. Less than seven
months later he was sentenced to a federal prison for conspiracy.
The Appellate Court, on hearing the writ, reversed the action of the
trial court in setting the bail at $50,000.00, declaring that such sum
was required for ".... no other purpose than to make it impossible
for him to give . . . bail," 88 but it proceeded to set petitioner's bail
at $5,000.89 This sum is clearly excessive for an ordinary vagrancy
charge, and was obviously imposed to insure the confinement, if pos-
sible, of the petitioner before the trial. It should be noted however
that the petitioner previously had escaped from penitentiaries, ° and
this alone would justify high bail, without an extensive examination
of accused's record.
82 Cf. Ex parte Calloway, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 347, 265 S. W. 699 (1924) (bail
allowed was not excessive, however).
83 State ex rel. Whitesides v. Judge, Twenty First Judicial District Court,
48 La. Ann. 95, 18 So. 904 (1896).
84 People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, supra note 81 at 412, 71 N. E. 2d
at 425.8 5 See Ex parte O'Clare, 136 Tex. Cr. R. 123, 124 S. W. 2d 141 (1939).86Kendrick v. State, 180 Ark. 1160, 24 S. W. 2d 859 (1930).87340 Ill. 464, 173 N. E. 8 (1930).
88 Id. 173 N. E. at 9.8 9 Id. 173 N. E. at 10.
90 Id. 173 N. E. at 9. Petitioner also had other charges pending against
him, but the court recognized that ".... bail ... cannot be fixed with reference
to securing his appearance to answer the other crimes with which he is
charged. .. ." Ibid.
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Later cases, however, have considered a prior criminal record
itself sufficient ground for setting an inordinately high bail, 91 and the
Sammons case has been cited as authority.9 2
In Ex parte Lonardo 93 the defendants had been previously con-
victed of serious crimes, and were, in the words of the prosecution,
"... members of an organized band of law breakers .... ," 94 After
being held in default of $75,000.00 bail on charges of being "suspicious
persons," defendants petitioned for bail in a reasonable amount. The
highest court of Ohio, holding the bail excessive, set the bond at
$15,000.15 After discussing the Sammons case at length the court
concluded that: ". . . [I] n view of the records of criminality of the
petitioners, we deem the sum of $15,000.00 to be reasonable." 96 It
is significant to note that in the Lonardo case it did not appear that
any of the petitioners had known propensities for escaping, or for-
feiting bonds. The court recognized that ordinarily the charge of
being a "suspicious person" would warrant a small bail, 7 but relied
upon the general criminal tendencies of the petitioners, as justifying
a high bond. Apparently such courts infer a strong propensity to
flee from the defendant's general bad character.
While this practice is perhaps susceptible to logical objections 08
-the converse, viz., that a person of previous good character and
reputation is not likely to flee is commonly recognized, and empiri-
cally defensible. Previous good character indicates that the defen-
dant may be wrongly accused of the charge, and willing to stand
trial, confident of vindication. A first offender has a good possibility
of being permitted to plead to a lesser degree of the crime charged,
thereby receiving a lighter sentence. Persons of good character and
reputation generally do not readily break home and family ties by
9lEx parle Holden, 55 Okla. Cr. R. 51, 24 P. 2d 665 (1933). See also Ex
parte Burnette, 35 Cal. App. 2d 358, 95 P. 2d 684 (1939). Bail of $50,000
pending appeal of rape conviction. Held, not excessive. "The trial judge, at
the time he fixed the bail was familiar with the evidence ... [H]e knew the
defendant was a recidivist; that he had been sentenced to Folsom; that he faced
a possibility of a fifty year term." Ibid.
92 Ex parle Lonardo, 86 Ohio 289, 89 N. E. 2d 502 (1949).
13 Ibid.
94 Id. 89 N. E. 2d at 503.
95 Id. 89 N. E. 2d at 504.96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 The argument that a defendant with a criminal record is likely to flee
from justice does not take into account the following considerations: (1) a
habitual criminal is more likely to be familiar with bailing procedure, and the
consequence of bail jumping than a first offender, (2) a habitual criminal rec-
ognizes that he may at any time need the privilege of bail again: and doesn't
wish to forfeit his ability to get bonds from the same or other bondsmen, by
jumping bail, (3) in jurisdictions like New York, where bail jumping is a
crime, the habitual criminal will consider the fact that his bail jumping will
add another offense to his record and place him that much closer to the "fourth
offender" category.
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absconding when charged with a crime. Family ties and "deep roots"
in the community have been recognized 99 as factors influencing dis-
cretion in granting bail, and are entitled to great weight in cases in-
volving youthful offenders. It has been stated that the ". . . age,
character and family situation of the [youthful] defendant have far
more bearing on the danger of flight than has the nature of the offense
charged." 100
c. Probability of Defendant's Guilt
The practice of looking to the prisoner's probable guilt in de-
termining whether or not he should be let to bail originated with the
ancient writ de odium et atya (of hatred and malice),101- The writ
was invoked by the prisoner to test the "causa" for his arrest, that
is: to determine whether he was arrested for reasonable cause or
purely out of the prosecutor's malice. Malice could be shown by
lack of proof of guilt, and the accused was forthwith bailed. Gradu-
ally the search for malice became figmentary, and the only question
considered was the probability of the prisoner's guilt as indicated by
the weight of the evidence. 0 2  It has been said that in England the
"probability of guilt has come to be the main guiding test in bail." 108
In the United States, however, the probability of defendant's guilt is
generally considered secondary to the gravity of the accusation against
him.10 4 "Bail is not allowed or refused on account of the presumed
guilt or innocence of the person accused, though the existence of doubt
... must be considered in determining the amount of the bail." 105
The probability of guilt for bail purposes is not determined ob-
jectively 106 but solely by the relative strength or weakness of the
prosecutor's case against the accused. An innocent defendant, with
a strong prima facie case against him, is as likely to flee as the
guiltiest. Conversely an obviously guilty defendant will have little
reason for absconding before trial, if, because of a lack of evidence
against him, or public sympathy in his favor, the charge is likely to
99 See United States ex tel. Potash v. District Director of Immigration,
169 F. 2d 747, 753 (2d Cir. 1948).100 The Forgotten Adolescent (1940), a publication of the New York Law
Society, reprinted in MICHAEL AND WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS AD-
mINISTRATION 956 (1940).
1011 STEPHEN'S HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 239 (1883).
102 Ibid.
103 Qasem, Bail and Personal Liberty, 30 CAN. B. REv. 378, 390 (1952).
204 Cole's Case, 6 Park. 695, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 280 (Sup. Ct. 1868).
105 People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 Ill. 464, 173 N. E. 8, 9 (1930).
108 An exception to this may be seen in cases where the accused has been
charged with larceny. The fact of whether he committed the crime has a very
important bearing on his ability to post bail and flee the jurisdiction, since the
stolen property may be a source of funds to obtain bail, or to indemnify the
surety.
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be dropped. People ex rel. Deliz v. Prison Warden,0 7 is an illus-
tration. The petitioner was indicted for perjury arising out of a
proceeding in which he sought to obtain custody of his children, con-
fined to a home. Bail was set at $5,000 in General Sessions but at
a subsequent Habeas Corpus proceeding before the Supreme Court
the bail was reduced to $1,000. The Appellate Division, affirming
the action of the Supreme Court, stated that "[t]he circumstance
of the alleged offense were such that ultimate conviction is doubtful,
although a prima facie case has been made out." 10s
The likelihood of an acquittal, determined by the result of a
previous trial, has been held sufficient grounds for admitting to bail
a defendant charged with murder. 10 9 Where the crime charged is
larceny, the presumption of guilt arising where the defendant is found
in possession of the loot has been considered strong enough to deny
him bail.10  As previously indicated, the weight of evidence against
the defendant is a paramount consideration in those states where bail
in capital cases is denied when "the proof [of guilt] is evident or the
presumption thereof is great." "I
d. Financial Ability of the Accused
The federal and state constitutional assurances that "excessive
bail shall not be required," compel the court to consider accused's
financial ability to post bond." 2  The fact that the accused is per-
sonally unable to give security in the amount set, does not by itself,
render the bail excessive,"13 but a bond manifestly out of all propor-
tion to the fund raising ability of the accused, effecting a practical
denial of bail, will generally be considered violative of the constitu-
tional mandate, and a reduction will be in order."14
The burden is on the applicant in a proceeding to reduce bail
to show his financial inability to meet the amount set."; Proving
that he is of limited means," 6 or verging on insolvency,"'7 or that
107 260 App. Div. 155, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 435 (1st Dep't 1940).
108 Id. at 156, 21 N. Y. S. 2d at 436.
109 Cole's Case, supra note 104.
110 People v. Ferris, 1 Wheel. Cr. C. 19 (N. Y. 1822).
"I Supra Sections Ib, c, this Note.
112 United States v. Brawner, 7 Fed. 86 (W. D. Tenn. 1881).
113 Ex parte Glass, 81 W. Va. 111, 93 S. E. 1036 (1917). To the effect that
the defendant's financial ability alone is not conclusive upon whether the bail
is excessive, see Ex parte Nelson, 125 Tex. Cr. R. 439, 69 S. W. 2d 126 (1934).
114 Mendenhall v. Sweat, 117 Fla. 659, 158 So. 280 (1934); Ex parte
Martin, 71 Tex. Cr. R. 383, 159 S. W. 1182 (1913).
115 Ex parte Thompson, 92 Tex. Cr. R. 291, 243 S. IV. 910 (1922) (must
be shown after bail is set, not anticipatory of it) ; Ex parte Neyland, 77 Tex.
Cr. R. 642, 179 S. W. 715 (1915).
116 Jones v. Cunningham, 170 So. 663 (Fla. 1936).
117 Mendenhall v. Sweat, supra note 114.
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he has posted large bonds in connection with other charges 118 is
usually sufficient to sustain this burden. Where, however, the defen-
dant is penniless, and has no source for borrowing, it would be an
idle gesture for the court to reduce bail.119 In such a case, the ac-
cused, if the crime charged is too serious to allow him to go on his
own recognizance, must of necessity be committed until trial.
The nature of the crime charged is an important factor to be
considered by the courts in conjunction with the accused's financial
ability. Thus, where the charge is larceny of a sum of money, bail
set at a fraction of the amount which the defendant is accused of
stealing, will invariably be considered insufficient, since if guilty (and
in many jurisdictions the accused is presumed guilty in bail pro-
ceedings) ,120 the defendant could conceivably indemnify his bail
sureties and flee with the remainder of the loot.1 1
Similarly, where the only punishment for the crime is a fine,
the amount thereof is often the criterion 122 the courts rely on in set-
ting bail, placing the bailed defendant in the dilemma of forfeiting
the same amount whether he absconds, or is found guilty of the
offense charged.
Closely connected with a consideration of the defendant's finan-
cial ability to post bond, is the additional factor of his financial abil-
ity to flee the jurisdiction and live in wealth and comfort elsewhere.
It appears well settled that ". . . ability to leave the jurisdiction is
not necessarily consistent with intent to do so," 12 and from the de-
cisions it may be gathered that "something more" must be shown to
sustain an inordinately high bail against a charge of excessiveness.
Thus, a defendant charged with a violation of the Selective Service
Act, had his bail reduced from $500,000 to $50,000 although it
was shown that he had extensive resources in, and was a citizen
of, a country from which the United States could not require
extradition.12 4
Nevertheless, a defendant's ability to leave the jurisdiction is a
weighty factor where he is involved in criminal activities crossing
many jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, bail set at $25,000 for a de-
118 State ex rel. Corella v. Miles, 303 Mo. 648, 262 S. W. 364 (1924). But
cf. Bush v. People, 68 Colo. 75, 187 Pac. 528 (1920).
,19Ex parte Smith, 141 Fla. 434, 193 So. 431 (1940).
120 Supra Section Ib, this Note.
121 United States v. Averett, 26 F. 2d 676 (W. D. Va. 1928).
122 II re Scott, 38 Neb. 502, 56 N. W. 1009 (1893).
123 United States ex rel. Rubenstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F. 2d 1002 (2d Cir.
1946). See also People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N. Y. 109, 71 N. E.
2d 423 (1947). "Relator's previous record . . . showed several previous in-
dictments, including one for 'jumping bail' . . . . He has business interests
in New York and California . . . . There is nothing whatever in the papers
to suggest any intention to flee the jurisdiction." Id. at 112, 71 N. E. 2d at 425.
124 United States ex rel. Rubenstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F. 2d 1002, 1003 (2d
Cir. 1946).
[ VOL. 27
fendant charged with selling heroin was sustained on appeal, largely
because of ". . . the international ramifications of [the defendant's]
operations, and the financial means . . .which might lead him to
leave the jurisdiction." 125
In determining the accused's ability to give bail, the court will
consider not only his personal resources, but those of his friends who
offer to go bail for him.126  Of late the courts have been confronted
with a wellspring of "friends" who are willing to go bail for defen-
dants of designated political persuasions. Some of them, notably the
Civil Rights Congress, have been willing to provide bail for defen-
dants whose defaults have resulted in a loss to the organization's
contributors of thousands of dollars.12 7
In attempting to cope with the situation where jumping bail
means little to the defendant or the organization providing his bail,
a number of distinct approaches have been attempted by the courts.
The huge resources of these organizations have been taken into ac-
count, and bail set at an amount which would otherwise be considered
exorbitant. However, such attempts to secure communist and other
well financed defendants to trial have been struck down as inconsis-
tent with the Eighth Amendment.128  Another more successful ap-
proach has taken the form of exercising the discretionary power
vested in the federal courts by statute to refuse bail supplied from
an undependable source. 12 9  In Christoffel v. United States 130 the
surety, the Civil Rights Congress, was held undependable, because
there was presented evidence of repeated defaults, and failure to
carry out the functions of a bail surety. But quaere: Must the Gov-
ernment wait for each of these organizations to suffer repeated de-
faults,' 3' before they may be considered unreliable? Apparently, yes.
Concededly, bail cannot be denied a defendant,132 nor can a surety,
125 People ex rel. Gagliano v. Warden, 188 Misc. 800, 801, 67 N. Y. S. 2d
220, 221 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
126 Ex parte Lewis, 38 S. W. 1150 (Tex. 1896).
127 In Christoffel v. United States, 196 F. 2d 560 (D. C. Cir. 1951), the
prosecution alleged, and proved to the satisfaction of the court, that ". . . said
Civil Rights Congress . . . acting in . . . capacity as bondman for . . .
numerous defendants and convicts . . .has failed to produce and to secure the
attendance of such defendants and convicts... ." Id. at 563.
128 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 (1951).
129 Christoffel v. United States, 196 F. 2d 560, 566 (D. C. Cir. 1951). Rule
46(e) FEz. R. Crim. P. provides ". . . [N]o bond shall be approved un-
less the surety thereon appears to be qualified."
130 196 F. 2d 560 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
131 Ibid.
132 Mr. Justice Jackson stated this forcibly in Williamson v. United States,
184 F. 2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950): "My task would be simple if a judge were
free to order persons imprisoned because he thinks their opinions are ob-
noxious, their motives evil and that free society would be bettered by their
absence. The plea of admitted Communists . . .is so hypocritical that it can
fairly and dispassionately be judged only with effort.
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who presents sufficient evidence of financial ability, be refused merely
because of his political persuasions. 133 Thus the discretionary power
of the court to refuse sureties does not adequately cope with the
problem. Apparently the solution lies in another direction. As added
leverage to secure the defendant to trial, New York enacted a statute
making "bail jumping" a crime. 34 There is no analogous provision
in the Federal Code.
Recently, however, a federal court devised a new method (or
revived an old one)135 to coerce the appearance of flighty defendants
well supplied with bail funds. The defendant, pending an appeal
from a conviction for violating the Smith Act, had applied for, and
was granted, bail by an order of a judge of the Federal District
Court of New York. 3 6  The order expressly stated that "for any
violation of any of the conditions . . . the bond . . . shall be for-
feited." 13 The defendant "jumped bail," and in a subsequent crim-
inal contempt proceeding, brought by the United States for the vio-
lation of the order, he contended that the sole penalty for "bail
jumping" is a forfeiture of the bond, since the Federal Code of Crim-
inal Procedure does not make "bail jumping" a crime.1 8  Defendant
was nevertheless convicted of criminal contempt under Section 401
of the Code for a willful disobedience of an order of the court.1' 9
The court did not consider an order granting bail different from any
other court order, a violation of which would be punishable by con-
tempt.' 40 Although the court's action may be justified by prece-
"But the right of every American to equal treatment before the law is
wrapped up in the same constitutional bundle with those of these Commu-
nists. . . ." Id. at 283. 284.
133Regina v. Badger, 4 Q. B. 468 (1843) (The sureties had attended
Chartist meetings.).
231 In New York, a defendant who "jumps bail" on a felony charge is guilty
of a felony. One who "jumps bail" on a misdemeanor charge is guilty of a
misdemeanor. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1694(a).
135 In Lee's Case, 15 Fed. Cas. 136, No. 8180 (E. D. Pa. 1865), the defen-
dant was held in contempt for violating a bail order. No reference was
made to this decision in United States v. Hall (infra note 136), the court
basing its power to punish for contempt upon Section 401, subd. 3, title 18 of
the U. S. Code, granting the federal courts power to punish as contempt a
willful violation of an order of the court.
136 United States v. Hall, 101 F. Supp. 666 (S. D. N. Y. 1951).
'13 Reprinted in Brief for Appellant, p. 8, United States v. Hall, 198 F. 2d
726 (2d Cir. 1952).
3s Appellant's Point III, Brief for Appellant, supra note 137 at p. 36.
139United States v. Hall, 101 F. Supp. 666 (S. D. N. Y. 1951), aff'd, 198
F. 2d 726 (2d Cir. 1952).
o140 "... [Q]uite apart from the inherent power of the court to punish ...
for contempt, we find a statutory grant of power. Section 401(3), Title 18
U. S. C. A. provides that 'A court of the United States shall have power to
punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its author-
ity, and none other as ...
'(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
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dent,141 the decision raises a number of questions. Will any willful
breach of a bail order, not including an absence from the jurisdic-
tion, be contemptuous? Can the decision extend the court's con-
tempt power to include defendants who flee while on pre-trial bail,
as well as from bail after conviction?
It is submitted that New York, by enacting a statute making
bail jumping a crime, and sharply defining the punishment to be in-
flicted therefor, has followed a better course. New York has suc-
ceeded in some measure in preventing pre-trial and post-trial "bail
jumping," and has also provided defendants with notice of non-
permissible conduct, a requisite for any criminal sanction.142  The
practice of assuming broad powers to punish absconding defendants
for contempt, it would seem, is an unwarranted extension of the con-
tempt power, which, it is recognized, is a weapon to be used with
caution. 143
e. Special Circumstances of Each Case
The problem of granting or denying bail in any case, is essen-
tially one for balancing two conflicting interests. On the one hand,
the public policy of the state demands that defendants stand trial,
and the most certain method of securing defendants is by pre-trial
detention. On the other is the policy that no man should be deprived
of his freedom until found guilty on a criminal charge.' 44 Where
this balance is relegated to judicial discretion, it is appreciable that
any rules laid down cannot be treated as more than signposts. Any
attempt to synthesize a reasonably symmetrical pattern of judicial
decree or command. June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 701.'" United States v.
Hall, 101 F. Supp. 666, 673 (S. D. N. Y. 1951).
1
41 Lee's Case, 15 Fed. Cas. 136, No. 8180 (E. D. Pa. 1865).
142 See Ludwig, Control of the Sex Criminal, 25 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 203
(1951). "Closely related to the ideal of protection of the individual's civil
liberty is the principle of Anglo-American criminal justice that there can be
no punishment for behavior unless it is prohibited by existing law (nidla poena
sine lege). This principle is in sharp contrast to the totalitarian doctrine that
there can be no wrong committed against the state which is incapable of being
punished (nullion crimen sine poena). Id. at 211. It is recognized that the
court's power to punish summarily for criminal contempt is an exception, but
this power is restricted (infra note 143). It is interesting to note that the
defendant in United States v. Hall, 101 F. Supp. 666 (S. D. N. Y. 1951),
aff'd, 198 F. 2d 726 (2d Cir. 1952), was sentenced to three years imprison-
ment for conduct which was not generally recognized as criminal (bail
jumping).
143 The results of abuses of the contempt power, which led to the enact-
ment of federal and state legislation to define the class of cases in which this
form of summary punishment might be used, are graphically illustrated in
Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Con-
tempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARv. L. REv. 1010, 1024 et seq. (1924).
144 Qasem, Bail and Personal Liberty, 30 CAN. B. REv. 378 (1952).
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conduct from the maze of decisions would be incomplete without a
reference to all the influences.
A delay in the trial of a case has been considered a proper basis
for granting bail or for reducing the amount originally set, in a num-
ber of cases.145 A delay from one term of court to the next has been
held sufficient to allow the prisoner to go at large on his own recog-
nizance. 1 46 Where the delay was caused by the jury's disagreement
in a prior trial for the same offense, 147 the defendant's claim for ad-
mission to bail was thereby greatly enhanced. Where the accused
was a delicate woman charged with murder it was nevertheless held
proper to admit her to bail, where she could not be tried for a mat-
ter of months.1 48  However, a delay granted at the accused's request
and for his own benefit is not a ground for granting him bail.14
Poor health has often secured pre-trial freedom to offenders not
otherwise bailable. "The humanity of our laws, not less than the
feelings of the court favor the liberation of a prisoner . . . under
such circumstances." 150 While it is not necessary to procure bail to
show that imprisonment will place the accused in immediate danger
of his life, it ordinarily must appear that a serious impairment of
health will thereby result.151 A plea of insanity forfeits a defendant's
right to bail since, by that plea, he places himself under the guardian-
ship of the court and may be confined.' 52
Although it is universally conceded that the true function of
bail is to secure the defendant's presence at the trial,153 in numerous
instances, other ends have been attempted 154 and some successfully
achieved by the use of prohibitive bail, notwithstanding the constitu-
tional provision that "excessive bail shall not be required." The use
of prohibitive bail has been unsuccessfully attempted where the pur-
pose was to confine the defendant in his protection from an outraged
public.155
145 People v. Goodwin, 1 Wheel. Cr. C. 443 (N. Y. 1850); People ex rel.
McManus v. Warden, 226 App. Div. 364, 235 N. Y. Supp. 112 (1st Dep't
1929); see People ex reL. Rupoli v. McDonnell, 277 App. Div. 74, 75, 98 N. Y.
S. 2d 182, 183 (2d Dep't 1950).
14 Commonwealth v. Phillips, 16 Mass. 423 (1820).
147 Cole's Case, supra note 104.
14sEx parte Black, 21 Okla. Cr. R. 69, 204 Pac. 937 (1922).
149United States v. Stewart, 27 Fed. Cas. 401, No. 16 (C. C. Pa. 1795).
150 See United States v. Jones, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,495 at 659 (C. C. Pa.
1813).151 Ibid.
152 People v. Watson, 14 Misc. 430, 35 N. Y. Supp. 852 (Gen. Sess. 1895).
15 See United States v. Foster, 79 F. Supp. 422, 423 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
154 See, e.g., Gusick v. Boies, 72 Ariz. 309, 234 P. 2d 430 (1951).
155 State v. Richardson, 176 La. 750, 146 So. 737 (1933). The defendant, a
negro, was indicted in Louisiana for the manslaughter of a white man. After
having a judgment of conviction set aside, Richardson was bailed at $500,
pending a new trial. This bail was raised to $5,000 because the sheriff had
notified the trial judge that there ".... was much ill feeling against Richardson
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The New York Court of Appeals, in two recent cases, 5 6 ap-
proved the use of prohibitive bail for material witnesses, who it was
feared, would not, because of the circumstances of the case, testify.
Two material witnesses were held in default of $250,000 bail, in con-
nection with the famed Scottoriggio killing.' 57  Three years later,
the Court in People ex rel. Gross v. Warden,58 recalling the Rao
case, sustained a bail of $250,000 for a gambler held as a material
witness in connection with the investigation of an extensive crime
ring in Kings County, New York.
In the Rao and Gross cases, bail was exacted pursuant to Sec-
tion 618-b of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure,5 9 which
grants to a judge of a court of record the power to require ". .. a
written undertaking . . . in such sum as he may deem proper" IGO
from a person who has been proved upon oath, to the court's satis-
faction, to be a "necessary and material witness for the people." "01
The discretion granted the judge by this statute relates solely to the
amount of the required undertaking, since the witness, who is not a
defendant in a criminal proceeding, is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.1 2 But as the New York Constitution provides that ".... ex-
cessive bail shall not be required," 103 such witness is also entitled to
bail in a reasonable amount. Since Section 618-b, like the statutory
provisions governing bail for defendants, 64 lays down no criteria to
guide a judge in setting the amount of the bond, the judge's discre-
tion appears entirely unfettered.
It would seem, however, that a mere witness is at least entitled
to a bond which would be considered reasonable if he were the ac-
cused.165 Until People ex rel. Rao v. Warden, there was little men-
in his home town and that he 'might get hurt'-meaning that he might get
lynched," if released on bail. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, how-
ever, holding that Richardson's right to reasonable bail, guaranteed by the
Louisiana Constitution, was paramount to any protective purpose of the lower
court.
156 People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of New York, 277 App. Div. 546,
101 N. Y. S. 2d 271 (2d Dep't 1950), aff'd iner., 302 N. Y. 173, 96 N. E. 2d
763 (1951); People ex rel. Rao v. Adams, Warden, 271 App. Div. 640, 67
N. Y. S. 2d 193 (lst Dep't), aff'd, 296 N. Y. 231, 72 N. E. 2d 170 (1947).
157 People ex rel. Rao v. Adams, sufpra note 156.
158 Supra note 156.
159 Laws of N. Y. 1904, c. 437, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1913, c. 238; Laws
of N. Y. 1915, c. 566, eff. Sept. 1, 1915.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Judge Desmond, dissenting in the Rao case, supra note 156, stated that
relators: ". . . not indicted or convicted, had an absolute right to be released
on their undertaking to appear when the case should be called." 296 N. Y. at
235, 72 N. E. 2d at 171.
133 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 5.
164 N. Y. ConE Camm. PRoc. § 553.
165 The constitutional provision against "excessive bail" would be meaningless
if it afforded protection from oppressive security requirements to indicted de-
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tion of what factors influenced the court in setting bail for wit-
nesses. 166 It was recognized, however, that a substantial amount
would operate to "protect" a witness.' 67 Of course, the only way
exorbitant bail will protect a witness is by causing his detention, for
failure to produce the required sum, and if the bail is designedly
exorbitant to effect this purpose, the constitution is violated. 68
In the Rao case, the Court of Appeals relied upon certain extra-
ordinary facts 169 as justifying a bail of $250,000, but the possibility
of misapplying Section 618 to "keep a witness locked up" 170 is a
formidable one. The Gross case should not be used as an argument
for extending the practice of requiring exorbitant bail for witnesses,
since in that case, perhaps even more so than in the Rao case the ex-
traordinary facts justified an extraordinary bail.' 71 There have since
been indications that the "judge is not free to make the sky the
limit" 172 in witness bailing.173
fendants, and operated with less rigidity in favor of an unindicted witness.
That the constitutional protection against excessive bail extends to a witness
as well as a defendant, see People ex rel. Richards v. Warden, 277 App. Div.
87, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 173 (1st Dep't 1950).
166 See People ex rel. Weiner v. Collins, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 774 (Sup. Ct.)
($50,000 bail sustained, little discussion of ground for high bail except to
"protect the relator" and "the rights of the people"), aff'd no opinion, 260
App. Div. 806, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 775 (2d Dep't 1940).
187 Ibid. See also People ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of County of Kings, 171
Misc. 248, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 341 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd no opinion, 256 App. Div.
1081, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 232 (2d Dep't 1939). "Section 618-b is an effective in-
strument by which law enforcement agencies endeavor to cope with offenders
• . .whose proclivities for spiriting away witnesses have . .. defeated many
just prosecutions .... " Id. at 251, 12 N. Y. S. 2d at 344.
18s People ex reL. Richards v. Warden of City Prison, 277 App. Div. 87,
98 N. Y. S. 2d 173 (1st Dep't 1950) ; Matter of Prestigiacomo, 234 App. Div.
300, 255 N. Y. Supp. 289 (4th Dep't 1932).
169 296 N. Y. at 234, 72 N. E. 2d at 170, 171. The court considered:
(1) The seriousness of the crime under investigation (murder).
(2) The background and extensive criminal records of petitioners.
(3) Their relationship to others against whom they might have been
called to testify.
(4) The possibility of flight to avoid giving testimony,
(5) The difficulty of procuring their return if they do leave the state.
170 Desmond, J., dissenting in People ex rel. Rao v. Adams, Warden, 296
N. Y. 231, 235, 72 N. E. 2d 170, 171 (1947).
171 It was stated that "Gross' . . . betting operations exceeded $50,000.00
daily." 277 App. Div. at 548, 101 N. Y. S. 2d at 273. "He also told the
Judge that if he talked he would implicate many police officials and furnish
corroborating evidence of gifts and payments of money to them." 277 App.
Div. at 549, 101 N. Y. S. 2d at 273. Gross was also being held under an in-
formation accusing him, with others, of ". . . conspiracy, and on sixty-five
additional substantive counts of bookmaking." Id., 277 App. Div. at 552, 101
N. Y. S. 2d at 276 (dissenting opinion).
172 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 8 (1951).
'17 See People er rel. Richards v. Warden, 277 App. Div. 87, 98 N. Y. S. 2d
173, 175 (1st Dep't 1950).
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Conclusion
A review of current bail decisions reveals that by and large, bail
has been granted in accordance with established principles. While
there have been instances where the judiciary was "more executively-
minded than the executive," 174 glaring errors have been rare. In
fact, Stack v. Boyle17 5 decided in 1951, represents the first case in
which the Supreme Court saw fit to discuss bail procedure at
length.1 7
6
Still there is need to fill in some gaps in the statutory scheme.
Though bail has perhaps justly been called a rich man's privilege,177
a general practice of letting poor defendants at large on their own
recognizance in prosecutions for serious crimes would be indefensible.
An alternative method, requiring poor defendants to report to police
authorities periodically, would be worthy of extensive study. This
practice has been employed in the past with some success in Italy.178
It is doubtful whether statutory enactments enumerating factors
to be weighed by the judge in admitting a person to bail will appre-
ciably decrease the number of instances where excessive bail is set. 1 9
Stack v. Boyle testifies to the fact that it is possible for a bailing judge
to ignore the statutory law of his jurisdiction as well as the common
law principles. Judge Desmond 18 0 of the New York Court of Ap-
peals has suggested 181 that the concurrence of three judges be re-
quired in setting bail above a certain figure,182 ostensibly to encourage
more reflection in bail applications. While this requirement would
possibly increase those instances in New York where bail could not
be had before a magistrate immediately following arrest, 183 since a
174 Qasem, Bail and Personal Liberty, 30 CAN. B. Rav. 378, 396 (1952).
175342 U. S. 1 (1951).
176 Ibid.
177 See "Is Bail a Rich Man's Privilege" by George F. Longsdorf, Member
of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules, 7 F. R. D. 309 (1948).
178 "The Italian code provides a substitute for bail for poor defendants. If
the accused cannot put up the bail bond, the judge may release him at the same
.time obliging him to report periodically to police authorities. The police, in-
formed of this measure, must bring to the attention of the judge any infrac-
tion of this obligation. This excellent provision saves many a poor defendant
a disagreeable sojourn in jail." Ploscowe, Measures of Constraint in European
and Anglo-American Criminal Procedure, 23 Gao. L. J. 762, 778 (1935).
179342 U. S. 1 (1951).
180 It is interesting to note that Judge Desmond dissented in a separate
opinion in People ex rel. Rao v. Adams, Warden, 271 App. Div. 640, 67 N. Y. S.
2d 193 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 296 N. Y. 231, 72 N. E. 2d 170 (1947), wherein the
court sustained a bail of $250,000 for two material witnesses to the Scotto-
riggio murder.
181 Desmond, Bail-Ancient and Modern, 1 BUFF. L. Rav. 245, 248 (1952).
182 Judge Desmond suggested a figure of: ". . . say, $25,000. .. ."
183 A magistrate desiring to set high bail would have to decide between set-
ting a bond under $25,000 and holding the defendant without bail (as was
done in People v. Hevern, supra note 55), until the concurrence of three judges
could be obtained.
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magistrate would be put to the choice of setting bail at a figure under
the statutory sum, or waiting for the time when three judges could
hear the application, the suggestion is indeed worthy of consideration.
Rather than extend the contempt power of the court to prevent
"bail jumping" by defendants bonded by irresponsible sureties, it is
suggested that "bail jumping" statutes, similar to the New York stat-
ute, be considered. 84
The various systems of bail procedure throughout the nation
suggest themselves as "experimental laboratories," to aid in the de-
velopment of flexible, constantly improving methods of securing the
attendance of defendants at trial. It would be remiss to ignore this
vast proving ground.
A
EQUITABLE MORTGAGES-A WAVERING DOCTRINE IN NEW YORK
Introduction
The munificence of equity is perhaps best exemplified by the
evolution therein of the law of mortgages. At common law, a mort-
gage was to all intent and purposes a conveyance of the legal estate,
subject to defeasance only if the mortgagor repaid the debt on a pre-
scribed day; failure to comply on that date vested absolute title in
the mortgagee.' To relieve against grievous hardships resulting to
mortgagors in many instances, equity developed a distinct theory of
mortgages, based on the ancient maxim that equity regards the sub-
stance rather than the form, and will relieve against forfeitures when-
ever the party can be fairly compensated by an award of money.
The mortgagor was given a right in equity to redeem the property
even after his default; it is this right to which the abbreviated term
"equity of redemption" refers.
Gradually, the concept arose in equity that certain security
transactions, wherein the debtor pledged his property to the repay-
ment of an obligation, could be effectuated, although title to the prop-
erty did not pass to the creditor. No legal right existed in the
creditor; merely an equitable right, in personam, to compel the debtor
to apply the subject of security to the debt. This form of security
transaction has come to be known as an equitable mortgage.2
184 New York is the only state making bail jumping a crime. ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 127 n. 97 (1947).
14 PommRoY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE § 1179 (5th ed. 1941).
2 See Note, 20 COL. L. REV. 519, 520 (1920) ; Walsh, Equitable Mortgages,
9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 429 (1932).
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